Dos artículos recientes sobre endeudamiento, pasado, presente, futuro:
Por una parte, Carmen M. Reinhart, Vincent R. Reinhart y Kenneth S. Rogoff publicaron “Debt Overhangs:Past and Present”.
En su abstract consignan: “We identify the major public debt overhang episodes
in the advanced economies since the early 1800s, characterized by public debt
to GDP levels exceeding 90% for at least five years. Consistent with Reinhart
and Rogoff (2010) and other more recent research, we find that public debt
overhang episodes are associated with growth over one percent lower than during
other periods. Perhaps the most striking new finding here is the duration of
the average debt overhang episode. Among the 26 episodes we identify, 20 lasted
more than a decade. Five of the six shorter episodes were immediately after
World Wars I and II. Across all 26 cases, the average duration in years is
about 23 years. The long duration belies the view that the correlation is
caused mainly by debt buildups during business cycle recessions. The long
duration also implies that cumulative shortfall in output from debt overhang is
potentially massive. We find that growth effects are significant even in the
many episodes where debtor countries were able to secure continual access to
capital markets at relatively low real interest rates. That is, growth-reducing
effects of high public debt are apparently not transmitted exclusively through
high real interest rates.
Por otra parte, Reinhart también publicó “TheReturn of Financial Repression”
Leemos en el resumen del artículo: “Periods of high
indebtedness have historically been associated with a rising incidence of
default or restructuring of public and private debts. Sometimes the debt
restructuring is more subtle and takes the form of 'financial repression'.
Consistent negative real interest rates are equivalent to a tax on bond holders
and, more generally, savers. In the heavily regulated financial markets of the
Bretton Woods system, a variety of financial domestic and international
restrictions facilitated a sharp and rapid reduction or 'liquidation' of public
debt from the late 1940s to the 1970s. The restrictions or regulatory measures
of that era had their origins in what would now come under the heading of
'macroprudential' concerns in the wake of the severe banking crises that swept
many countries in the early 1930s. The surge in public debts that followed
during the Great Depression and through World War II only made the case for
stable and low interest rates and directed credit more compelling to
policymakers. The resurgence of financial repression in the wake of the
2007-2009 financial crises alongside the surge in public debts in advanced
economies is documented here. This process of financial 'de-globalization' may
have only just begun.”
Extraído de Nep–his issue ©2012 by Bernardo Batiz-Lazo.
