Con relación a la
crisis europea en perspective histórica, Michael D. Bordo y Harold James
publicaron The European
Crisis in the Context of the History of Previous Financial Crises. En
cuyo resumen describen: “There are
some striking similarities between the pre 1914 gold standard and EMU today.
Both arrangements are based on fixed exchange rates, monetary and fiscal
orthodoxy. Each regime gave easy access by financially underdeveloped
peripheral countries to capital from the core countries. But the gold standard
was a contingent rule—in the case of an emergency like a major war or a serious
financial crisis --a country could temporarily devalue its currency. The EMU
has no such safety valve. Capital flows in both regimes fueled asset price
booms via the banking system ending in major crises in the peripheral
countries. But not having the escape clause has meant that present day Greece
and other peripheral European countries have suffered much greater economic harm
than did Argentina in the Baring Crisis of 1890.”
Por su parte, Andreas
Hoffmann ha publicado The euro as a
proxy for the classical gold standard? Government debt financing and political
commitment in historical perspective, en cuya introducción se lee: “In
spite of the recent troubles in the euro area, Jesus Huerta de Soto (2012), a
famous proponent of the gold standard, argues that the euro should be
considered a 'second best to the gold standard' and is worth being preserved.
From a classical liberal point of view, he sheds some light on the euros
similarities with the gold standard and on some important advantages of the
currency union over its alternative, flexible exchange rates in Europe.
According to Huerta de Soto (2012), the main advantage of the introduction of
the common currency is that - like when 'going on gold' - European governments
have given up monetary nationalism. Like the gold standard, the euro limits
state power as it prevents national central banks from manipulating exchange
rates and inflating away government debt. Currently, he argues, the common
currency - like previously the gold standard - forces important reforms and/or
spending cuts upon the countries of the euro area that face severe debt and structural
problems. In this respect, the euro should be seen as 'a proxy for the gold
standard'. In this policy paper, I attempt to address some similarities and
differences in the institutional framework of the classical gold standard (1880
- 1912) and the European Monetary Union (EMU) (1999 - ) that affect government
debt financing and the way in which countries react to crisis. I argue that -
in line with Huerta de Soto (2012) - giving up monetary nationalism and
committing to the rules of either the gold standard or EMU initially restricted
the scope of state action. Therefore, the euro - like previously the gold
standard - provided some (fiscal) policy credibility. Fiscal policy credibility
was the main determinant of capital market integration and low government
borrowing costs in Europe under both systems. But in contrast to Huerta de Soto
(2012), I shall emphasize that neither the gold standard, nor the euro itself
force reforms and spending cuts upon countries that face crisis and debt
problems. The political commitment to the monetary systems determines the
willingness to reform or cut spending and therewith fiscal policy credibility
in crisis periods: (...) ver más acá
